【英語学習】Token Economy　トークン・エコノミー

引用：Token Economy

1 Unchaining the Token Economy Through CrossLedger Interoperability
Ali Sunyaev, Niclas Kannengießer
Transfers of ownership of assets (e.g., fiat money,
company shares, or usage rights) between agents (here,
individuals or organizations) is often mediated by trusted
third parties (TTPs) such as banks or notaries to increase
reliability of the transfer process. The involvement of TTPs
often introduces drawbacks, like increased costs, longer
processing time, and the presence of a single point of
failures. These drawbacks motivate the automation and
decentralization of several services offered by TTPs.
Technological advances have enabled the digital representation and management of asset ownerships using
tokens on decentralized digital platforms without the need
for TTPs. A token is a sequence of characters that serves as
an identifier for a specific asset (e.g., a personalized usage
rights) or asset type (e.g., a cryptocurrency). The abilities
to represent assets in form of digital tokens on a decentralized digital platform and to assign ownership of these
assets to agents in a fraud-resistant way can help to reduce
drawbacks related to TTPs (e.g., the presence of single
points of failures) and enable a new type of economy: the
token economy. In tackling drawbacks related to TTPs, the
token economy holds a large transformative value (Benlian
et al. 2018) that can strongly affect businesses (e.g., by
enabling novel business models and increasing transparency of business processes) and our daily life (e.g., by
being able to monetize our own personal data instead of
just giving it away).

This chapter discusses the key concept of decentralization, which the token economy is built on, from two fundamental perspectives (i.e., technical and political
decentralization) and provides propositions to discuss
decentralization. Moreover, this chapter explicates the need
for interdisciplinary research (e.g., information systems
research, computer science, management science, and
social science) to embrace both perspectives.
In the token economy, technical protocols take over
several tasks that traditional TTPs previously handled. For
example, technical protocols running decentralized digital
platforms can check individual agents’ legitimate ownership of assets and create a tamper-resistant record of the transfer of their ownership.

Moreover, the use of decentralized digital platforms can increase flexibility in using
tokens because agents can implement and use tokens as identifiers for various types of assets (e.g., usage rights,land ownership, or money).

By reducing the need for traditional TTPs and increasing flexibility, the token economy
holds the potential to support collaborations and cooperation between agents (e.g., in terms of trust; Conway and
Garimella 2020; Tian 2017). Moreover, the token economy
ultimately allows for novel business models (e.g., decentralized crowdsourcing) and improved business relations
(e.g., through increased transparency of business processes) by being able to transfer ownership of physical or
digital assets using tokens.

Like traditional asset transfers, token transfers require
strong security guarantees that decentralized digital platforms must reliably provide.

In the token economy, for
example, a decentralized digital platform must guarantee
that users cannot simultaneously use the same tokens
multiple times (i.e., double-spending), while being highly
available and tamper-resistant. Many of the required
security guarantees for business ecosystems are addressed
by the security characteristics of distributed ledger technology (DLT), including fraud-resistance, high availability,
and tamper-resistance. DLT enables the operation of a
highly available, append-only distributed database (i.e., a
distributed ledger) with distributed storage and computing
devices (i.e., nodes) in an untrustworthy environment
(Kannengießer et al. 2020a; Sunyaev 2019) – an environment with arbitrary occurrences of (temporarily) unreachable nodes or fraudulent actions (e.g., double-spending).
From the microeconomic perspective, there can be
multiple instances of the token economy. To create an
instance of the token economy based on DLT, there are two
principal creational options: first, to use custom tokens of a
distributed ledger; second, to create tokens on an existing
distributed ledger (To¨nnissen et al. 2020). The first option
is typically pursued by consortia of agents that operate a
private distributed ledger (e.g., using a private Ethereum
blockchain), where only authorized agents can join, read
transactions from, and append new transactions to the
distributed ledger (see Table 1; Kannengießer et al., 2020a).

The second option requires an agent to decide for
an existing distributed ledger for the token economy
instantiation, where they create custom tokens using a
smart contract.
Each creational option has benefits and drawbacks. For
example, private distributed ledgers are often more flexible
in terms of establishing own rules among agents in the
consortium, whereas public ones are more complex to
regulate (e.g., because of their openness for arbitrary
nodes).

Nonetheless, using private distributed ledgers
limits the transparency benefits for external agents that are
provided by public ones and can hinder the use of tokens
across token economy instances. Thus, network effects are
reduced, which narrows the reach of the individual token
economy instances.

Besides creational options, agents must gauge operational options. Operational options comprise the assignment of responsibilities to agents in the token economy
instance (e.g., the operation of a node) and the selection
among different distributed ledgers, considering their
technical capabilities (e.g., transaction throughput). For
example, private distributed ledgers often offer a shorter
transaction confirmation latency compared to public-permissionless distributed ledgers, but have a smaller degree
of decentralization and, thus, are less fraud-resistant compared to public ones (Kannengießer et al., 2020a).

DeKannengießer et al., 2020aspite a vast variety of possibilities related to operational options, trade-offs between　DLT characteristics (e.g., availability vs. consistency)　hinder distributed ledgers from being capable of simultaneously fulfilling the　requirements of all token economy instances (Kannengießer et al., 2020a; O’Donoghue et al.2019).
This incapability fuels the development of new and specialized distributed ledgers designed for similar or different purposes (e.g., Ethereum and Tezos have a strong focus on decentralized computations, while IOTA focuses on supporting the Internet of Things with a lightweight protocol).
The increasing diversity of offered distributed ledgers that can be used to instantiate a token economy accompanied by the consideration of creational and operational options pertaining to the creation of token economy instances causes heterogeneity within the token economy.
This heterogeneity can cause an isolation of token economy instances because distributed ledgers are still hardly capable of decentralized interoperability (e.g., for the interaction between agents and the dynamic emergence of relations between agents; Moore 2006; Peltoniemi 2005).

Cross-ledger interoperability (CLI) is needed to solve
the challenges related to heterogeneity and to realize the
full potential of the token economy (e.g., regarding business process innovations; Weking et al. 2020). CLI refers
to the communication between distributed ledgers, for
example, to carry out cross-ledger asset transfers or to
execute smart contracts across distributed ledgers (Kannengießer et al. 2020b). So far, progress on CLI has been
largely theoretical (e.g., Back et al. 2014; Herlihy 2018;
Zamyatin et al. 2019). Based on these theoretical contributions, researchers and practitioners have developed various CLI artifacts (e.g., Cosmos and Polkadot) from which
first architectural patterns for the design of CLI artifacts
have emerged, including notary schemes and sidechains
(e.g., Deng et al. 2018; Kannengießer et al. 2020b; Koens
and Poll 2018). These research contributions and practical
implementations represent major advances in CLI, but also
highlight new challenges, such as the atomicity of crossledger transactions and understanding of creational and
operational options beyond the boundaries of individual
distributed ledgers. We categorize these challenges into
two groups: technical decentralization and political
decentralization of CLI.
Technical Decentralization of CLI. Technical decentralization of CLI is the degree that increases (and
decreases) with the number of distributed, interconnected
nodes that operate independently without a central
authority (e.g., a static leader node in consensus finding).
Determining the appropriate degree of technical decentralization currently represents a core challenge within CLI
because it strongly affects the design of CLI artifacts
(e.g., regarding the information flow between distributed
ledgers) and its security characteristics (e.g., atomicity and
availability). One can understand the degree of technical
decentralization as a continuum that ranges from no to full
decentralization. No decentralization of CLI implies that a
single node (i.e., a connector) manages all communication
between distributed ledgers. This single connector represents a single point of failure, which makes no decentralization most comparable to asset transfers using traditional
TTPs (e.g., notaries). In contrast, full decentralization of
CLI requires all nodes of a distributed ledger to have the
capabilities to connect to any other node of any other
distributed ledger, which eliminates that single point of
failure, but can cause large communication overhead. For
example, when a consortium operates a private distributed
ledger and decides to interoperate with another one, each Cross-ledger interoperability (CLI) is needed to solve
the challenges related to heterogeneity and to realize the
full potential of the token economy (e.g., regarding business process innovations; Weking et al. 2020). CLI refers
to the communication between distributed ledgers, for
example, to carry out cross-ledger asset transfers or to
execute smart contracts across distributed ledgers (Kannengießer et al. 2020b). So far, progress on CLI has been
largely theoretical (e.g., Back et al. 2014; Herlihy 2018;
Zamyatin et al. 2019). Based on these theoretical contributions, researchers and practitioners have developed various CLI artifacts (e.g., Cosmos and Polkadot) from which
first architectural patterns for the design of CLI artifacts
have emerged, including notary schemes and sidechains
(e.g., Deng et al. 2018; Kannengießer et al. 2020b; Koens
and Poll 2018). These research contributions and practical
implementations represent major advances in CLI, but also
highlight new challenges, such as the atomicity of crossledger transactions and understanding of creational and
operational options beyond the boundaries of individual
distributed ledgers. We categorize these challenges into
two groups: technical decentralization and political
decentralization of CLI.
Technical Decentralization of CLI. Technical decentralization of CLI is the degree that increases (and
decreases) with the number of distributed, interconnected
nodes that operate independently without a central
authority (e.g., a static leader node in consensus finding).
Determining the appropriate degree of technical decentralization currently represents a core challenge within CLI
because it strongly affects the design of CLI artifacts
(e.g., regarding the information flow between distributed
ledgers) and its security characteristics (e.g., atomicity and
availability). One can understand the degree of technical
decentralization as a continuum that ranges from no to full
decentralization. No decentralization of CLI implies that a
single node (i.e., a connector) manages all communication
between distributed ledgers. This single connector represents a single point of failure, which makes no decentralization most comparable to asset transfers using traditional
TTPs (e.g., notaries). In contrast, full decentralization of
CLI requires all nodes of a distributed ledger to have the
capabilities to connect to any other node of any other
distributed ledger, which eliminates that single point of
failure, but can cause large communication overhead. For
example, when a consortium operates a private distributed
ledger and decides to interoperate with another one, each
consortium member may set up an own connector to enable
interoperability and avoid dependencies on other consortium members’ (potentially fraudulent) connectors. Then,
each consortium member is in charge of maintaining an
own connector which increases the overall maintainability
efforts for the distributed ledger compared to the use of
only one connector for the entire distributed ledger (no
decentralization). Because of the individual benefits and
drawbacks of the different degrees of decentralization,
agents must individually decide which degree of decentralization suits their purpose(s) when connecting a distributed ledger to another.
CLI can be achieved in a direct or indirect manner
(see Fig. 1). In direct CLI, neither a traditional TTP nor a
decentralized digital platform is required to enable interoperability between separated distributed ledgers. Nodes of
one distributed ledger can directly communicate with those
of the target distributed ledger. In contrast, indirect CLI
requires a (centralized or decentralized) TTP that mediates
the communication between distributed ledgers. Although
direct CLI is desirable (e.g., less single points of failure),
indirect CLI facilitates interoperability between multiple
distributed ledgers because individual distributed ledgers
must only comply with the specifications of the CLI artifact
instead of the specifications of all target distributed ledgers.
The limited interoperability between distributed ledgers
(e.g., caused by their large heterogeneity) resembles the
incompatibility of (early) electronic data processing
approaches before international standards were introduced
(e.g., SWIFT for financial transactions). To facilitate the
communication between heterogenous distributed ledgers,
interfaces and procedures are required (e.g., like in electronic data interchange during supplier onboarding or in
open banking). For example, standardized interfaces
broaden the compatibility of CLI artifacts with more distributed ledgers and ease the development of flexible
wallets supporting decentralized cross-ledger transactions.

Political Decentralization of CLI. Political decentralization of CLI refers to the degree of equal distribution of
permissions and responsibilities across all agents that
independently act according to their individual incentives
and work jointly on a common goal. Current studies point
out the complexity of political decentralization, for example, regarding decentralized governance and related political challenges (e.g., organization of decision rights; Beck
et al. 2018; Reijers et al. 2016). To date, agents usually
take part in the governance of the distributed ledger(s) to
which they contribute (e.g., by providing a node). With
CLI, agents can create cross-ledger business relations,
which will affect the creational options (e.g., because of
potentially larger network effects) and the governance of
the involved distributed ledgers. For example, tokens
stored on the target distributed ledger will become usable
for agents of other token economy instances. Technical
advancements can become more difficult because of more
dependencies between distributed ledgers. These exemplary challenges point out the need for decentralized crossledger governance aside from the highly discussed decentralized governance, which mostly focuses on individual
distributed ledgers.
Depending on the degree of technical decentralization
and the choice for direct or indirect asset transfers,
decentralized cross-ledger governance may introduce
political centralization through a hierarchical organization
of nodes. For example, when a consortium uses a single
connector maintained by a single agent (low degree of
technical and political decentralization) to achieve indirect
interoperability, a two-level hierarchical structure emerges
from the roles of the different nodes: regular nodes in the
distributed ledger and the connector. The emergence of this
hierarchy indicates a low technical and political degree of
decentralization because permissions and responsibilities
are not equal among nodes. In the previous example, the
single agent controlling the connector represents a kind of
TTP, introduces a single point of failure, and can impede
CLI and the token economy instances on separate distributed ledgers, for example, by delaying or blocking
agents’ asset transfers or becoming a performance bottleneck. Agents of the separate distributed ledgers depend on
few agents controlling the respective connectors (e.g., regarding the implementation of technical updates for CLI),
potentially giving rise to hierarchy in the governance of
CLI and, eventually, of the individual distributed ledgers.
In full technical decentralization with direct interoperability, all nodes (and consequently all agents that control
nodes) reside on the same hierarchical level. This favors democratic decisions of nodes across distributed ledgers,
the integration of CLI artifacts, and the interoperability
with token economy instances across distributed ledgers.
Proposition 2: The degree of decentralization of the
token economy depends on the degree of decentralization
of individual token economy instances and their interoperability considering multiple perspectives (e.g., political
and technical).
Drawing from the introduced limitations of separated
token economy instances and our propositions, we conclude that there is a pressing need for CLI resulting from
the inherent characteristics of the token economy that
reflect those attributed to business ecosystems (e.g., competition and cooperation between organizations). A single
(kind of) CLI artifact will not interconnect all distributed
ledgers, and we will witness a large heterogeneity of distributed ledgers and CLI artifacts that use the full spectrum
of the degree of decentralization and direct and indirect
CLI. For example, no decentralization of CLI could be
used for confidential data management, while full decentralization of CLI better prevents censorship across distributed ledgers.
The consideration of human actors in the design of
distributed ledgers and CLI artifacts points out the complex
and strong interdependence between technical decentralization and political decentralization to achieve true
decentralization. The complexity of this interdependence
makes it challenging to understand the relationship
between the social and the technical and to explain the
effects of decentralization on the token economy and ISs in
general when only one of the two domains is considered.
To really understand decentralization of ISs, research
should combine the social and the technical and take a
sociotechnical perspective on decentralization (Sarker et al.
2019). Thereby, information systems (IS) research can be
the missing link between the technical and the political
perspective on decentralization.
To discuss emerging areas for interdisciplinary research
related to technical and political decentralization in the
token economy and especially point out the importance of
IS research and innovations in this emerging field, we
invited researchers and practitioners with different foci on
the token economy. The invitees present emerging trends
related to the token economy and draw propositions from
their scientific and practical works.
Roman Beck (European Blockchain Center, IT University of Copenhagen) sheds light on the standardization in
DLT from a macroeconomic perspective and discusses the
token economy as a foundation for network goods represented as tokens.
Horst Treiblmaier (Modul University Vienna) synthesizes the concept of sustainability with the many facets of
the token economy and concludes with an agenda for token sustainability. Thereby, he clarifies the role of the token
economy based on decentralized digital platforms to
innovate existing business models and even create new
ones.
Mary Lacity (Blockchain Center of Excellence,
University of Arkansas) introduces existing applications of
the token economy in supply chain management to track
and trace assets and shows novel directions for future
research and practice.
Johann Kranz (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t
Munich) elaborates on DLT systems’ potential for decentralizing the digital economy. He argues that decentralization is a possible remedy to mitigate the excessive
concentration of epistemic and economic power of a few
dominant firms which raises increasing social, political,
and economic concerns.
Gilbert Fridgen (University of Luxembourg) elaborates
on the innovations emerging from the token economy from
the perspectives of the industry and individuals and elaborates on the decentralization of token economies.
Ulli Spankowski (Bo¨rse Stuttgart) discusses the innovations through the token economy from the finance perspective and proposes potential transformations of the
financial market through tokenization based on DLT.
Andre´ Luckow (BMW Group) presents the potential of
the token economy for the automotive industry by
improving supply chain transparency by means of the
example of the DLT system Partchain.

2 Standardized Tokens as Network Goods and Source
of Value Creation
Roman Beck
The token economy depends on the widespread acceptance and use of interoperable DLT protocols as interaction
standard in order to benefit from positive network effects in
inter-organizational networks and to avoid challenges that
can occur when different DLT protocols compete in the
same industry or market. Competition between DLT protocol standards can jeopardize value creation in inter-organizational networks, as DLT protocols share
characteristics of club, common, and public goods that only
unfold their full potential when assimilated widely. Once a
DLT protocol is instantiated in a specific way, it is called
DLT system.
In other words, standardization of DLT protocols to
harvest their potential benefits is more complicated than
standardization of goods that have predominantly a standalone value, as is typically the case with private goods.
Furthermore, tokens cannot unfold their potential unless a
supporting system is in place, comprising commonly
accepted norms, agreements off-ledger, and technical
norms and rules enforced on-ledger. Only after commonly
accepted sociotechnical systems have been assimilated,
value creation in inter-organizational networks can take
place.